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DEBATE
RACIAL PROFILING AND THE WAR ON TERROR
For Professor David Rudovsky, of Penn, there is just as little to
recommend the racial profiling techniques employed by law enforce-
ment in the "War on Terror" as there is in the "War on Crime." Ru-
dovsky argues that profiling is inaccurate-both as to whom it targets
and whom it does not-susceptible to abuse, and counterproductive
to intelligence-gathering efforts. He goes on to note that the painful
lessons of history likewise counsel against its continued use. Professor
R. Richard Banks, of Stanford Law School, shares much of Rudovsky's
concern, but maintains that " [a] ccording primacy to the issue of racial
profiling is more likely to impede than to clarify our thinking about
the fairness and effectiveness of law enforcement measures." Banks
concludes that it is better to evaluate directly the fairness and efficacy
of antiterrorism measures, without the distraction of trying to decide
whether a challenged practice should be viewed as racial profiling.
OPENING STATEMENT
Racial Profiling: No More Justified in the War on
Terrorism than It Is in the War on Crime
David Rudovskyl
In the wake of 9/ 11, the Bush Administration invoked broad no-
tions of executive power to fight the "War on Terror." Five years later,
there is much dispute over the constitutionality and efficacy of many
of these programs, including National Security Agency (NSA) elec-
tronic surveillance, incarceration and treatment of "enemy combat-
ants" at Guantanamo Bay, "rendition" of terror suspects to other
countries for interrogation, the practice of "alternative interrogation"
of suspects in our custody, and limits on habeas corpus.
This dialogue will focus on another law enforcement tactic that
has been equally controversial: racial profiling. Before the events of
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9/11, there was a strong national consensus that racial profiling was
both unwise and ineffective. President Clinton condemned racial
profiling as "morally indefensible," presidential candidates George W.
Bush and Al Gore both agreed that the practice should be aban-
doned, and up to 80% of the public found this practice to be unfair.
Yet, while almost all agreed that it was impermissible to stop or
search someone solely on the basis of race, some in law enforcement
urged that reliance on race, in conjunction with other factors, was le-
gitimate, even if race was not part of a specific suspect description. By
this reasoning, the widespread practice of racial profiling in the "War
on Drugs" was justified as reflecting the supposedly disproportionate
numbers of racial minorities involved in drug trafficking.
This conventional law enforcement "wisdom" did not withstand
empirical and legal scrutiny. As the Attorney General of New Jersey
reported in his investigation of racial profiling on the New Jersey
Turnpike:
The evidence for this conclusion is, in reality, tautological and reflects as
much as anything the initial stereotypes of those who rely upon these sta-
tistics. To a large extent, these statistics have been used to grease the
wheels of a vicious cycle-a self-fulfilling prophecy where law enforce-
merit agencies rely on arrest data that they themselves generated as a re-
suilt of the discretionary allocation of resources and targeted drg en-
forcement efforts.
The most obvious problem in relying on arrest statistics, of course, is
that these numbers refer only to persons who were found to be involved
in criminal activity (putting aside for the moment the presumption of
innocence). Arrest statistics, by definition, do not show the number of
persons who were detained or investigated who, as it turned out, were
not found to be trafficking drgs or carrying weapons. Consistent with
our human nature, we in law enforcement proudly display seized drg
shipments or "hits" as a kind of trophy, but pay scant attention to oui far
more frequent "misses," that is, those instances where stops and searches
failed to discover contraband.
Empirical evidence supports this view. On the New Jersey Turn-
pike, seizures of contraband made incident to traffic stops were at a
rate of 10.5% from white drivers and 13.5% from African-Anerican
drivers. In Maryland, searches on 1-95 resulted in "find rates" that
were roughly equal by race. Yet, in these states as in others, the rate of
stops and searches of African-American drivers, which ranged up to
60-70% of the stops, was vastly disproportionate to both the rate of
drug possession and the number of minority drivers.
The events of 9/11 reignited both the practice of racial profiling
and the debate over its use. Since Al Qaeda was a Muslim organiza-
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tion and the planes were hijacked by nineteen Arab Muslim men from
the Middle East, did it not make sense to single out Arab Muslims in
any investigatory efforts? Many people who had condemned racial
profiling in the War on Drugs were now convinced that it would be an
effective tool in the War on Terror.
For the Bush Administration, there was no hesitation. Within clays
of the 9/11 attacks, the Department of Justice (DOJ) launched the
first large-scale detention of persons based on race and country of ori-
gin since the internment of Japanese Americans in World War II.
Thousands of suspected immigration violators were incarcerated un-
der a veil of secrecy that left their families, employers, and even their
lawyers completely in the clark as to their location or the nature of the
charges against them. Ultimately, over 700 foreign nationals were de-
tained for significant periods of time by order of the Attorney General
as persons "of interest" to the 9/11 investigation. As it turned out, the
only basis for the government's "interest" in these 700 individuals was
their Arab and Muslim identities. There was no individualized suspi-
cion.
Soon thereafter, the government widened the racial and ethnic
profiling net in a "Special Registration" program and "Absconder Ap-
prehension Initiative" that resulted in the arrest and preventive deten-
tions of several thousand additional Muslims and Arabs. Once again,
the stated basis for the detention was a suspected link to terrorism,
but, as before, this link was simply one of ethnicity. Ethnic profiling
was also the basis for the November 2001 order of Attorney General
Ashcroft to interview 5000 persons, aged eighteen to thirty-three, who
had legally entered the United States in the past two years from coun-
tries linked to terrorism.
Meanwhile, at airports and at the country's borders, it was appar-
ent that Muslims and Arabs were being targeted for special attention
for questioning, searches, and even for decisions prohibiting them
from flying. The government insisted that it was not engaged in racial
or ethnic profiling, but its practices spoke in far different terms. In-
deed, in 2003, in issuing guidelines on the use of race in criminal in-
vestigations, the DOJ essentially codified the government's split per-
sonality with respect to racial profiling: racial profiling was "wrong"
and "stereotyping certain races as having greater propensity to com-
mit crimes is absolutely prohibited," but "efforts to defend and safe-
guard against threats to the national security or the integrity of the
Nation's borders" are exempt from racial profiling prohibitions.
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In declaring that racial profiling is wrong and immoral, except
where national security is at stake, the government asserts that there is
something unique about the War on Terror that makes ethnicity and
race legitimate factors when the same tactics have been found to be
both ineffective and contrary to equal protection principles in other
criminal investigations. The answer has been that terrorism threats in
the United States are almost entirely a function of racial and ethnic-
based hatred, and that those who would commit terrorist acts in the
future almost assuredly are Al Qaeda members or supporters, who are,
therefore, of Muslim and Arab extraction. Presumably, it is this high
correlation between the targeted ethnic population and the criminal
acts that distinguishes profiling in terrorism investigations from that
which occurs in other contexts.
There are several fundamental flaws in this approach. First, it
simply is not true that contemporary terrorists are from a single ethnic
group. Richard Reid-the "shoe bomber"-did not fit the profile, as
his mother was British and his father was Jamaican. Nor did John
Walker Lindh, an American, who was convicted for his activities with
Al Qaeda. Since Islamic tenets are part of the religious principles of
millions of persons outside of the Middle East, it is difficult to see how
a focus on Muslim Arabs will prevent attacks by others. It would be
surprising if Al Qaeda, which has shown an ability to adjust to efforts
to destroy its organization, would not be sufficiently flexible to arm
persons who do not meet our profiles. And we should not forget that
the Oklahoma City bombers and others who have committed terrorist
acts were home grown and of various religious backgrounds and races.
Second, even if the underlying assumption is correct, with over
one million Muslims in the United States, how do you begin to narrow
the field? Are all of them suspects? Only young Muslim men? What-
ever the standard, we are left with the same problem that haunts the
use of all profiles and stereotypes. Assume that 90% of a certain type
of crime is committed by a particular racial or religious group, that
there are over a million persons who comprise that group, and that
1000 of them are involved in the criminal activity. That leaves 99.9%
of the suspect group innocent, yet somehow presumed at risk for
criminal behavior. We should not employ race or ethnicity when
more effective techniques of law enforcement-such as criminal intel-
ligence or observations of criminal conductm-are available. Indeed,
our experience since 9/11 demonstrates that racial profiling does not
work. Of the thousands of persons detained as immigration violators
in the wake of 9/11, only one person was charged with terrorist
crimes. We might not expect the government to bat 1.000 or even
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.300, but when the batting average is near zero, we should look care-
fully at the tools that are being used.
Indeed, even where race or ethnicity is used as a factor among
others, there is a significant risk of abuse. In November 2006, the
government settled a claim by lawyer Brandon Mayfield for $2 million
for his wrongful arrest as a terror suspect after his fingerprints were
erroneously matched to those on a bag of detonators in Madrid. As
the DOJ Inspector General determined, because of Mayfield's Islamic
beliefs, investigators did not reexamine the case even after Spanish
police challenged their fingerprint findings.
Third, there are distinct disadvantages to racial profiling. Where
criminal conduct is organized within commun ities, one of the most
effective law enforcement responses is the development of intelli-
gence from within those communities. Thus, if the belief is that ter-
rorist cells might be operating in a particular Muslim community, it is
essential to develop reliable intelligence from members of the local
population. Racial profiling may well undermine such efforts. If the
community believes that it is the "enemy" by virtue of its ethnic iden-
tity, it will be far more difficult to encourage its members to report
suspicious activity. We should not expect support from those we tar-
get as presumptive terrorists.
Finally, history has something to teach us as well. The most noto-
rious and ineffective government national security programs have
been built on racial stereotypes. For instance, the Palmer raids after
World War I-in which thousands of immigrants were arrested,
beaten, deported, and imprisoned in the wake of a terrorist bombing
in the United States-targeted immigrants by ethnicity and amounted
to nothing more than a vicious reprisal based on group characteris-
tics. The internment of Japanese Americans during World War II,
perhaps the greatest stain on our constitutional fabric aside from slav-
ery and Jim Crow discrimination, reflected the unwise triumph of ra-
cism over fair national security policies. Even the ideological profiling
of the McCarthy era was destructive of basic American values.
The wisdom reflected in equal protection principles applies
equally to criminal and terrorist investigations, and we act at our peril
in disregarding fundamental protections in the hope of achieving
greater security.
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REBUTTAL
Why Racial Profiling Is the Wrong Question
R. Richard Bankst
I found much of value in Professor Rudovsky's thoughtful discus-
sion of antiterrorism and drug interdiction efforts. I share his assess-
ment that both the War on Drugs and the War on Terror-his pri-
mary focus-have gone awry in important respects and warrant
vigorous criticism. I join Professor Rudovsky in opposing ineffectual
antiterrorism practices that unjustifiably burden large numbers of in-
nocent Arabs and Muslims.
I do not, however, agree with a premise on which his argument
seems to rest: that a commitment to end racial profiling would elimi-
nate, or at least substantially reduce, misguided and overbroad meas-
ures that burden large numbers of innocent Arabs and Muslims. Ra-
cial profiling is the wrong question in the War on Terror. While the
invocation of racial profiling may pack a rhetorical punch and help to
motivate political activism, focusing on the issue of racial profiling
does not help us better evaluate the efficacy or fairness of antiterror-
ism measures.
Commentators use the term racial profiling to refer to the selec-
tion of suspects on the basis of racial (and, for the purposes of this
discussion, ethnic or religious) stereotypes that implicate large num-
bers of innocent people. Not all uses of race in the selection of sus-
pects, however, constitute racial profiling. Law enforcement officers
do not engage in racial profiling if they investigate individuals of a
particular race because they are seeking a criminal suspect described
as a member of that race. The use of race as a component of a suspect
description is a widespread and accepted practice that no court has
ever regarded as racially discriminatory, much less prohibited. Simi-
larly, commentators view law enforcement officers' use of suspect de-
scriptions that include race as not only permissible, but desirable,
even if racial profiling is flatly prohibited.
The distinction between (permissible) suspect description reli-
ance and (impermissible) profiling is especially fuzzy in the antiterror-
ism context. Many antiterrorism measures assailed by some as racial
profiling might be viewed by others as permissible uses of suspect de-
scriptions. Currently, law enforcement agents may be seeking hun-
dreds, or even thousands, of individuals-predominantly Arab or
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Muslim men-who are suspected of participating in, supporting, or
having information about terrorist activity. Suppose that airline secu-
rity personnel or immigration officials at border checkpoints subject
those individuals who match some key aspects of a description of a
known or suspected terrorist-for example, name and nationality-to
additional, and burdensome, questioning. To many, this approach
would seem a form of racial profiling, inasmuch as it could result in
the investigation of many thousands of innocent Arabs and Muslims
and further stigmatize the entire group as potential terrorists. Others
though might view the agents' questioning of (only) those who match
some aspect of the description of a specific terrorist suspect as a sensi-
ble means of preventing any known terrorists from boarding an air-
J)lane within or to the United States.
In the antiterrorism context, many practices that involve suspect
descriptions may nonetheless seem to many a form of profiling be-
cause they burden so many innocent Arabs and Muslims. The terrorist
threat is ongoing and nationwide, and much of the intelligence on
which antiterrorism agents rely is likely not specific as to time or
place. The dissemination of terrorist descriptions to law enforcement
agencies throughout the nation only exacerbates the potential burden
on innocent people. Even suspect descriptions that are specific as to
time and place-for example, that three Arab men will attempt to
blow up the George Washington Bridge next week-may nonetheless
be so vague that they encompass a large number of people.
The permissibility of suspect description reliance also raises a
question about the characterization of other investigatory decisions
that disproportionately burden Arabs and Muslims. For example, if
antiterrorism agents are seeking a specific suspect who is known to be
a deeply religious Muslim, would a decision to investigate mosques in
a city where the suspect has been known to reside constitute racial or
religious profiling? What if the authorities focus their investigation on
a neighborhood with many immigrants from an Arab suspect's home
country? In both cases, the authorities' efforts to apprehend a par-
ticular suspect would undoubtedly burden innocent people, many of
whom would be Arab or Muslim.
Such measures might be criticized as racial profiling, or defended
as a sensible and nondiscriminatory means of locating a particular
suspect. Some might emphasize the purpose of the investigation in
characterizing it as the permissible use of a suspect description; others
might highlight its broad scope and impact on Arab and Muslim
communities in declaring it another instance of profiling.
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The prospects for agreement about what constitutes racial profil-
ing are further undermined by the fact that the terrorist threat is
posed by the criminal enterprise known as Al Qaeda, whose members,
as with most gangs, are bound together by a shared social identity-in
this case religious fundamentalism. A decision to investigate only in-
dividuals who share a salient characteristic of gang membership-for
example, a commitment to a fundamentalist version of Islam-
straddles the boundary between suspect description reliance and ra-
cial profiling. The consideration of religion in an effort to apprehend
members of a gang that is organized along religious lines might be
viewed as profiling or as suspect description reliance. The law en-
forcement officers would have a specific description, but it would be
of a criminal organization rather than an individual. Even if antiter-
rorism agents are not looking for a specific individual, would it be ra-
cial profiling to focus attention on fundamentalist Muslim groups?
W"hat if antiterrorism agents scrutinize charitable organizations that
send money to Muslim religious groups in countries with an active Al
Qaeda presence? Or, what if agents subject electronic or internet
communications written in languages used by Al Qaeda operatives to
especially close scrutiny?
Once we recognize the likelihood of disagreement about whether
particular practices that burden Arabs and Muslims should be viewed
as racial profiling, it should become clear that not much should turn
on the question of racial profiling, nor, more generally, on the ques-
tion of whether race-or religion, or nationality-was part of any gov-
ernment agent's decision-making process. Some practices that do not
rely on race-for example, the proliferation and indiscriminate use of
no-fly lists-might be objectionable and unfair for a whole host of rea-
sons. Other practices that do consider race-or nationality or relig-
ion-might be perfectly sensible. Rather than attempting to resolve
disagreement about whether particular practices constitute racial pro-
filing, a more sensible and useful approach would be to consider di-
rectly whether the challenged practices are effective and fair. Focus-
ing directly on the issues of fairness and efficacy would not resolve
disagreement. But it would properly frame the inquiry.
According primacy to the issue of racial profiling is more likely to
impede than to clarify our thinking about the fairness and effective-
ness of law enforcement measures. Consider the campaign against ra-
cial profiling in drug interdiction. By the late 1990s, racial profiling
in drug interdiction efforts had been uniformly denounced by activ-
ists, politicians, and high ranking law enforcement officials alike. Lit-
erally hundreds of law enforcement agencies or legislative bodies pro-
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hibited racial profiling and began to collect data concerning law en-
forcement officers' stop-search practices.
One would be wrong to assume, though, that these reforms typi-
cally eliminated the racial disparities in stops, searches, arrests, or in-
carceration that had prompted the anti-racial profiling campaign in
the first place. In fact, racial disparities persisted in the overwhelming
majority of jurisdictions, including New Jersey, which Professor Ru-
dovsky correctly identifies as having been a focal point of the racial
profiling controversy.
As the debate matured, disagreement about the propriety of racial
profiling transformed into disagreement about the existence of racial
profiling. Civil rights activists and law enforcement agencies often
drew contrary conclusions from the same empirical evidence. Dispari-
ties that activists viewed as incontrovertible evidence of racial profiling
were typically defended by law enforcement agencies as a simple re-
flection of the demographics of crime, particularly drug trafficking.
Widespread agreement about the impermissibility of racial profiling
in drug interdiction efforts relocated disagreement to the question of
whether law enforcement officers had engaged in racial profiling. I
would expect a similar sort of process to operate in the antiterrorism
context.
In conclusion, then, while I oppose many of the same policies that
Professor Rudovsky finds objectionable, the reason for my opposition
is not that such policies entail racial profiling. Rather, I oppose those
practices that Ijudge as ineffectual-practices that often are desperate
efforts to calm our fears rather than enhance our security. And I
would oppose even those potentially useful policies that, in my view,
impose greater burdens on Arabs and Muslims than it is fair to ask
them to bear. In assessing efficacy and fairness, I see no need to ask,
"have antiterrorism agents engaged in racial profiling?"
CLOSING ARGUMENT
David Rudovsky
I welcome Professor Banks' response to my opening statement, in
particular his argument that "racial profiling is the wrong question in
the War on Terror." Since we both examine investigatory methods
with respect to standards of fairness and efficiency, his challenge to
my racial profiling arguments helps to frame this debate.
Professor Banks recognizes that the selection of suspects on the
basis of racial characteristics implicates large numbers of innocent
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persons, and that the problem is "especially acute" in the terror con-
text. However, he believes that a racial profiling focus does not pro-
vide a sound basis upon which to evaluate particular investigative
methods. More specifically, he asserts that in dealing with Al Qaeda
and its fundamentalist and violent version of Islam, law enforcement
may have good reason to target Arabs and Muslims. According to Pro-
fessor Banks, the question that should be asked is whether the investi-
gatory methods are fair and effective.
Maybe we are saying the same thing-with different terminol-
ogy-but I strongly believe that in applying these criteria, the insights
we have gained regarding the moral and strategic flaws of racial profil-
ing are integral to a credible determination of whether certain meth-
ods are fair and effective. If racial profiling generally leads to both
unfair and ineffective law enforcement, why should we ignore these
lessons in the War on Terror?
The examples provided by Professor Banks demonstrate the use-
fulness of the consideration of racial profiling factors. He discusses
the problems faced by investigators in responding to ongoing threats
of terrorism where intelligence is not specific as to time or place and
to those problems posed in more particularized settings; for example
where-hypothetically-information is received that three Arab men
are planning to blow up the George Washington Bridge. As I argued
in the opening statement, a limited focus on Arabs or Muslims in the
more generalized context is unfair and ineffective because it is racial
profiling: an undifferentiated suspicion of many of a particular race
or ethnic group, where only a few may be guilty. Where the police
have a suspect description by race and a targeted location, the prob-
lems associated with racial profiling are mitigated, but not eliminated.
For example, if police have information that three white men are
planning a robbery of a specific bank, while they may limit their inves-
tigation to white men, Fourth Amendment principles should still ap-
ply with respect to what investigative steps may Iye taken. This infor-
mation, standing alone, would not justify forcible stops, detentions, or
searches of all white men observed in the proximity of the bank. In-
deed, the interplay of non-discrimination and privacy principles is
critical. Generalized surveillance of Arab and Muslim men near the
bridge may be appropriate depending on the nature of the intelli-
gence, but a mere rumor would not justify the detention or search of
all of these men. The same can be said with respect to a suspect who
is known to frequent a particular mosque. If the information provides
sufficient cause under the Fourth Amendment, police surely have
grounds to surveil the area to facilitate the stop or arrest of the sus-
pect. However, without more information connecting the suspect
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criminal conduct to others in the mosque, there are no legitimate
grounds to further intrude into those premises. If police investigation
of mafia-related crimes did not warrant suspicion of all persons of Ital-
ian descent, the War on Terror should not justify an open season on
Arab and Muslim men.
Investigations of drug activity, underworld violence, terror and
other criminal acts implicate a range of law enforcement methods-
some common and some distinct-depending on the target. Racial
profiling has the distinct potential for discriminatory and counter-
productive measures in any of these contexts. Law enforcement based
on stereotypes is too blunt, almost always overbroad, and a poor sub-
stitute for investigations based on particularized suspicion.
CLOSING ARGUMENT
R. Richard Banks
I continue to find much of value in Professor Rudovsky's discus-
sion of antiterrorism efforts and share his view that the permissibility
of such measures should turn on their fairness and effectiveness.
However, I do not share Professor Rudovsky's belief that such inquiry
would be furthered by trying to decide which practices constitute ra-
cial profiling. The same normative disagreement that has shaped de-
bate about the )ermissibility of racial profiling in the fight against ter-
rorism would subvert efforts to reach consensus about whether
particular practices rely on racial profiling.
To understand why, consider again the concept of racial profiling.
The term racial profiling, like the broader concept of racial discrimi-
nation, is typically used in two different senses, one descriptive, the
other evaluative. The characterization of a practice as racially dis-
criminatory denotes a factual observation, a claim, for example, that a
police officer decided to investigate a particular individual because of
stereotypes about the racial group to which that person belongs. To
designate a practice racially discriminatory also connotes moral con-
demnation of that practice-or at least a judgment that the practice
should be impermissible. In common usage, then, the term racial dis-
crimination simultaneously expresses a factual observation and a
moral evaluative stance; it both describes and condemns.
To reason, as Professor Rudovsky does, that a practice is objec-
tionable because it is racial profiling implicitly posits a factual descrip-
tive claim as the basis for an evaluative one. The relation between the
two claims is that the evaluativejudgment is a consequence of the de-
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scriptive one. The descriptive claim then must precede, and be made
independently of, the evaluative one.
One problem with trying to declare antiterrorism practices objec-
tionable because they rely on racial profiling is that the antiterrorism
context raises precisely the circumstances where evaluative judgments
are most likely to shape purportedly factual descriptive claims. Con-
sider a situation that Professor Rudovsky and I both discuss: the gov-
ernment has intelligence information that implicates specific Arab
Muslim men in the planning of future acts of terrorism, and, on the
basis of that information, subjects to extra scrutiny some large number
of Arab Muslim men, none of whom, it turns out, has any connection
to terrorist plotting. One might view such antiterrorism measures as
racial profiling, in light of the many innocent people burdened with-
out the apprehension of any wrongdoers. Or one might view such
measures as the permissible use of suspect descriptions, insofar as the
antiterrorism agents were attempting to apprehend specific individu-
als suspected of terrorist plotting. There is no purely factual basis for
preferring one characterization rather than the other.
One's judgment as to whether the challenged practice is racial
profiling would likely be shaped by one's assessment of its propriety.
A belief that the government should be able to do such a thing would
incline one not to view the practice as racial profiling. Conversely, a
feeling that such a practice is ineffective and unfair to Arab Muslims
might cause one to pronounce it a form of racial profiling. Whatever
one's conclusion, the ostensibly factual observation would have been
influenced by one's normative evaluation of the particular practice.
A circularity problem arises. It makes little sense to say that a
practice is objectionable because it is racial profiling, if the reason one
thinks the particular practice is racial profiling is because it is unfair
and ineffective. Stated more generally, a descriptive claim cannot
provide the basis for an evaluative judgment if the descriptive claim
already incorporates the evaluative judgment for which it would os-
tensibly serve as the basis. In the antiterrorism context, the charac-
terization of a practice as racial profiling will often represent a conclu-
sion that it is objectionable, rather than the means of having reached
that conclusion. Just as commentators may disagree about the per-
missibility of racial profiling in antiterrorism efforts, so too would a
flat out prohibition intensify disagreement about whether particular
practices rely on racial profiling.
Moreover, reliance on descriptive claims that conceal evaluative
inquiries might obscure the considerations of fairness and effective-
ness that should inform antiterrorism policy. The belief that we are
arguing about the factual question of whether a practice is racial pro-
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filing might make it more difficult to assess forthrightly the issues of
fairness and efficacy. In sum, then, in trying to evaluate the fairness
and effectiveness of antiterrorism measures, the belief that we need to
decide whether a particular practice is racial profiling not only won't
help us. It may hinder us.
